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Abstract 
We describe an approach to deriving efficient rules for interpreting the intended meaning of 
indirect speech acts. We have constructed a system called SALLY that starts with a few, 
very general principles for understanding the intention of the speaker of an utterance. After 
inferring the intended meaning of a particular utterance, SALLY creates a specialized rule 
to understand directly similar utterances in the future. 
Introduction: Indirect Speech Acts 
Responding appropriately to a question often requires the listener to understand the intention 
of the speaker. For example, consider the following simple question: 
Q: Do you have a match? 
Taken literally, this question is a request for information. However, in most contexts, this 
question should be interpreted as a request for the listener to give the speaker a match. This 
is a kind of speech act (Austin, 1962) called an indirect speech act (Searle, 1975), in which the 
intent of the speaker differs from the direct, literal meaning of the speaker's utterance. For a 
computer to take part in a conversation, it is essential that it have the ability to understand 
indirect speech acts. An important part of this capability is to gain an understanding of 
the class of situations in which the indirect interpretation should be preferred to the direct 
interpretation. For example, a slight variant of the above question is typically interpreted 
differently: 
Q: Do you have a BMW? 
Two approaches to the interpretation of indirect speech acts have been proposed in compu-
tational linguistics. One approach, typified by QUALM (Lehnert, 1979), makes use of a large 
number of fairly specific, knowledge-intensive interpretation rules. For example, QUALM 
contains one rule that interprets a question to verify if the listener possesses an object as a 
request for the listener to give the speaker the object, if the object is small and inexpensive. 
The primary advantage of the knowledge-intensive approach is that it is efficient. A dis-
crimination net that indexes the interpretation rules directs the search for an interpretation. 
There are several disadvantages with the knowledge-intensive approach as implemented in 
QUALM. First, it is difficult if not impossible, to encode an exhaustive set of rules that would 
perform well on a large variety of examples. Second, the knowledge-intensive approach does 
not capture any of the generalities among interpretation rules. A wide variety of knowledge-
intensive interpretation rules are specialized forms of a general rule: one interpretation of 
a question to verify that a precondition of a plan is true is that the speaker wants the 
listener to execute the plan. Finally, as a cognitive model, the approach does not specify 
how the interpretation rules might be acquired or extended as new plans are learned. The 
interpretation of an indirect speech act is a fun~-~2P. oLthe_planaJih~t_th~ __ S_p_~(},k~rJ:>~Ueves 
_i!i~E!~~~~E_j~---~~R~P1~ __ of __ ~~~f_gtj_gg (or understanding) (Perrault and Allen, 1980). When 
__ _9-!L<l,dclWQu.aLP!et:ri _i~ __ cl£911i:red,it_rnay p~ !l~~~~§a.l'y_for_ the knowledge .. intensiye appr()ach to 
.- acquire additional int~!P1:~~c:l,t}_~I1- rules. -
The alternative approach to finding the intended meaning of an indirect speech act is to 
have a small set of general rules that a listener may use to infer the speaker's plan from 
Jhe utJ~pc~ (Allen and Perrault, 1980; COlieri--anci-Perraurt-;-T979r-Tiiis--ap-proacli·--takes 
advantage of plannigg_191:II1_9-l!~_II1§. (Wilensky, 1983; Fikes, 1971) to represent the content 
of a conversation (Grosz and Sidner, 19~6; Litman and Allen, 198-7f--u~H.k~-kiiowledge-
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intensive rules, these general rules can be applied to a variety of examples since the rules 
operate on a specificati9n. __ 0Lth~-~p~~kel''s_ol'J!ste11er'~ plans. However, there are also several 
disadvantages to thi~-approach. First, the search- fo~ -an interpretation can be inefficient. 
Second, as a cognitive model, it is not cleartriat_a-human listener goes-llirotigli--theTong 
inference process that is necessary to arrive at the interpretation. For example, Searle (1975) 
has said: "In normal conversation, of course, no one would consciously go through the steps 
i:µvolved in this reasoning." Allen and Perrault (1980) have made similar statements that do 
not leave open the possibility that people unconsciously go through a long inferenc~ chain: 
Note that, in actual fact, people probably use much more specialized knowledge 
to infer the plans of others, thereby bypassing many of the particular inferences 
we suggest. Our approach so far, has been to specify a minimal set of reasoning 
tools that can account for the behavior observed. 
Psycholinguistic studies have shown that in many circumstances, it takes no longer for a 
person to recognize an indirect speech act than to find the direct meaning of an utterance. 
For example, in one experiment (Gibbs, 1983), subjects found it no more difficult to find 
the indirect interpretation of a request such as "Can't you be friendly?" than the literal 
interpretation" 
The approach that we take is a hybrid }_~twe_~Il:_tJ!~- ~p_e<::!fic,_Jnowleqge-intensive_ approach 
and the general, plan-based approach. In particular, we make use of general plan-Dasea----
~les ~fo ir_!{~rnxet_noyel (t9 __ th~--system) u~terances. However, on~e an~futerp~refationh~~-- -
'been fo~;{d, we derive a knmvledg~~-i~t~11~i~~-rule to inter:pret dire_ctly "§imilC11'" utt~~!lces in 
the future. The~Wleclge:Tnt~nsli~i~l~j~ cr~_at_~cJ Qy_~~RlC1:r!~liqµ-_p~~ed kg,_n1i_ng tech~i-q~~~----­
(Mrtchell~ Kedar-Cabelli, and Keller, 1986; DeJong and Mooney, 1986).~The_''~im!i_~r~,-_Jit­
terances are t~c:>-~~ tJiat_ share the_features that the plan-based analysis needed-to check_to 
infurth~-§t~~1~£~~~~!()-1!_otth~jggii:~~t ~pe~ch act. 
Explanation-based learning 
Explanation-based learning_(EBL) is a learning method which analytically generalizes an 
~ystems share a common approach to generalization. First, an examplen-
- problem is solved producing an explanation (occasionally called a justification, or a proof) 
that indicates what information (e.g., features of the example and inference rules) was needed 
to arrive at a solution. Next, the example is generalized by retaining only those features of the 
example which were necessary to produce the explanation. This generalization characterizes j 
the class of problems that will have the same solution for the same reason as the training 
example. EBL explicates- (or operationalizes (Keller, 1987)) information that is implicitly/ 
represent~c:ljp._~_sy_s_t~I_Ii. 'For example, ACES (Pazzani, 1987) is a syst~mThaflearns-diag1losis 
heuri;tf;- (i.e., efficient heuristics that associate faults with symptoms) from a functional 
device description. In this work, we are using a modified version of the EGGS (Mooney and 
Bennett, 1986) explanation-based learning algorithm to explicate conditions under which an 
indirect interpretation of a speech act can be inferred. 
I 
If the effect of act is e 
and actor wants e 
then actor wants act. 
If actor! wants actor2 to want to do act 
then actor! wants actor2 to do a_ct 
A precondition for actor a~ransing object 
is that actor possess object. 
actor! will atrans (cheap) object to actor2 
if actor! and actor2 are friends. 
Figure 1. Speech act interpretation rules1 
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[Action-Effect Rule] 
[Want-Action Rule] 
[give requires have] 
We illustrate the process that SALLY goes through to learn a rule to interpret directly indirect 
speech acts with an example. Consider again the request: "Do you have a match?" The 
surface speech act here is a verification of possession of a match. However, in most contexts, 
the intent of the speaker is not to ask for a verification. Rather, the speaker is requesting 
some action of the hearer, e.g., to give the match to the speaker. The ATRANS-Request 
Conversion rt1le (Lehnert, 19!8) sta,tes that given a verification request of a po~~~;si~~-~ate 
Of some 9bjeCt--which haiHttle-value,·-a, p~~~ibJe target interpretation.1s a request of the-hearer 
·to give the speaker that object. We address here the issue of learning this rule. We can trace 
tlir~ugh the understanding cycle used to generate the ATRANS interpretation using the 
method of Allen and Perrault (1980). SALLY makes use of backward chaining inference rules 
for inferring the speakers intentions, and for indicating the effects and preconditions of plans. 
Figure 1 illustrates four of the rules that are used in the following example. 2 
The initial representation of the surface speech act is: 3 
HBSW (S-REQUEST (S, H, INFORMIF (H, S, POSSESS (H, MATCH)))) 
This is read as: "The hearer believes the speaker wants ... " (this is the intentional part of 
the speaker's speech act) " ... ·to perform a yes-no question regarding the hearer's possession 
of a match." Using the action-effect (an effect of the S-REQUEST is that HW(HDo action)) 
and want-action rules, SALLY can infer: 
HBSW (INFORMIF (H, S, POSSESS (H, MATCH))) 
That is, the hearer believes that the speaker wants the hearer to inform the speaker whether 
1 Action-Effect and Want-Action are from Allen & Perrault (1980). 
2 The Appendix lists the rules using SALL Y's actual representation. 
3 In this discussion, we use Allen and Perrault's notation because it is more concise than the equivalent 
representation used in the computer implementation. 
4 
or not· the hearer possesses the match. An effect of INFORMIF is KNOWIF; using the 
action-effect rule again SALLY can infer: 
HBSW (KNOWIF (S, POSSESS (H, MATCH))) 
From here, SALLY can use the know-positive rule and infer: 
HBSW (POSSESS (H, MATCH)) 
Since possessing a match is a precondition to giving it away, SALLY can use the precondition-
action rule to infer: 
HBSW (ATRANS (H, S, MATCH)) 
This inference process interprets the surface speech act of asking about possession of a match 
as an indirect speech act of requesting the hearer to give a match to the speaker. For a request 
speech act to have the desired effect, it is necessary that that the hearer want to comply 
with the request. SALLY has a rule stating that someone will give someone else an object 
if it is of little value and there is an ar.p.icable relationship between the two people. Using 
a small data-base of plan-based rules, SALLY constructs an inference chain of length seven 
to infer the speaker's intent in this question. Explanation-based learning techniques can be 
used to "compile" this inference process. 
The effect of explanation-based learning on this example is to create a knowledge-intensive 
rule which avoids many of the intermediate steps of the plan-based inference. The knowledge-
intensive rule has the same conclusion as the longer inference process. The preconditions 
on this rule are exactly those features of the surface speech act and the situation which 
were tested during the inference process to establish the conclusion. In this case, these 
preconditions are that the object of the inquiry be of little value, and that the relationship 
between the speaker and the hearer be an amicable one. Figure 2 illustrates the result of 
the explanation-based learning process on this example. 
Once SALLY has acquired the rule in Figure 2, the interpretation of similar queries is more 
direct. For example, to interpret the question "Do you have some gum?" requires an 
inference chain of length two. The constraints that are derived during the explanation-based 
learning process do not allow utterances such as "Do you have a BMW?" to be interpreted 
as requests. 
Current status 
SALLY is implemented in Common Lisp. It does not currently contain a parser. The input 
to SALLY is a representation of the surface speech act of an utterance; the output is an 
identification of the intended speech act (e.g., REQUEST, INFORM, etc.). Using a similar 
line of reasoning to the above example, we have been able to reconstruct some of QUALM's 
(<- (INTERPRETATION CS-REQUEST (SPEAKER ?S) 
(HEARER ?H) 
(ACT (TYPE INFORMIF) 
(ACTOR ?h) 
(TO ?S) 
(STATE (TYPE POSSESS) 
(OBJECT (P-OBJ 
(REQUEST (SPEAKER ?H) 
(HEARER ?S) 
(ACTOR ?H)))) 
(TYPE ?T) 
(OWNER ?H) 
(LOC ?L) 
(VALUE CHEAP))) 
(ACT (TYPE ATRANS) 
(ACTOR ?H) 
(OBJECT (P-OBJ (TYPE ?T) 
(OWNER ?H) 
(LDC ?L) 
(TO ?S) 
(FROM ?H)))) 
(RELATIONSHIP ?H ?S AMICABLE)) 
(VALUE CHEAP))) 
Figure 2. A knowledge-intensive indirect speech act interpretation rule. 3 
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knowledge-intensive heuristics from a minimal set of interpretation rules and a library of 
plans. For example, we can generate the Function-Request Conversion rule. Consider: "Do 
you have your car here?" The surface speech act is a verification request regarding the 
location of the hearer's car. An indirect interpretation could be "Would you drive your 
car?" Recognizing that possession of some object in the immediate vicinity is a precondition 
to using that object, we can infer the desired indirect interpretation. 
One limitation of SALLY is that it is limited to utterances that can be addressed in the 
plan-based approach to interpreting indirect speech acts. For example, there is no difference 
in the literal meanings of "Can you pass the salt?" and "Are you able to pass the salt?" 
However, the indirect interpretation is acceptable of the former but not the latter. Plan-
based approaches such as ours ignore the linguistic information associated with the literal 
meaning of the utterance (Hinkleman, 1988). One solution to this problem, which is more 
faithful to the psycholinguistic data, is to have rules that map phrases to interpretations 
without having an intermediate representation of the literal meaning. 
Conclusion 
We have proposed a hybrid approach to the interpretation of indirect speech acts that com-
bines the best features of knowledge-intensive and plan-based approaches. In particular, the 
intended meaning of common types of indirect speech acts are found rapidly by knowledge-
intensive rules that directly map the surface speech act of an utterance to the intended 
4 Questions of the form "Do you possess an inexpensive object?" are interpreted as a request for the hearer 
to give the speaker the object if the speaker and the hearer have an amicable relationship. 
6 
meaning. However, it is not necessary to hand-code and maintain a large set of interpreta-
tion rules. The knowledge-intensive rules are acquired by using explanation-based learning 
after the interpretation of a novel utterance is found by a general, but inefficient search 
process. 
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Appendix 
; indirect interpretation 
(<- (interpretation Cs-request (speaker ?s) 
(hearer ?l) 
?a1) 
(request (speaker ?l) 
(hearer ?s) 
?a2))) 
; "want precondition" 
(want ?s (request (speaker ?s) 
(hearer ?l) 
?a1) 
?a2) 
(want-perform ?l ?s ?a2)) 
"action effect" rule 
(<- (want ?a ?act ?res) 
(effect ?act ?e) 
(want ?a ?e ?res)) 
; "want-action" rule 
(<- (want ?a (want ?s ?act ?res1) ?res2) 
(want ?a ?act ?res2)) 
"know positive" rule 
(<- (want ?a (knowif ?a ?p) ?res) 
(want ?a ?p ?res)) 
"precondition-action" rule 
(<- (want ?a ?p }res) 
(precondition ?p ?res)) 
; an "amicable" relationship is required for ATRANSing cheap objects 
(<- (want-perform ?actor ?for (act (type atrans) 
(actor ?actor) 
(object (p-obj (type ?x) 
(owner ?actor) 
(loc ?loc) 
(value cheap))) 
(to ?for) 
(from ?actor))) 
(relationship ?actor ?for amicable)) 
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; precondition for ATRANSing is possession 
(<- (precondition (state (type possess) 
(object ?o) 
(actor ?a)) 
(act (type atrans) 
(actor ?a) 
(object ?o) 
(to ?to) 
(from ?a)))) 
; precondition for using is possession 
(<- (precondition (state (type possess) 
(object ?o) 
(actor ?l)) 
(plan (type use) 
(actor ?a) 
(object ?o)))) 
; effect of request is want 
(<- (effect (request (speaker ?a) 
(hearer ?s) 
?act) 
(want ?s ?act ?res))) 
; effect of informif is knowif 
(<- (effect (act (type informif) 
(actor ?a) 
(to ?s) 
?p) 
(knowif ?s ?p))) 
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